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KANT'S PHILOSOPHY CRITICALLY EXAMINED.

KANT'S philosophy has become the beginning of a new epoch in the evolution of human thought through a formulation of its basic problem and by starting out in the right direction for its solution; but Kant has not spoken the final word.

Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Hume's scepticism, and it was Hume's problem as to the nature of causation which prompted him to strike a new path in the conception of philosophical problems.

Kant threw light on Hume's problem by generalising it and recognising the kinship of the conception of causation to mathematics and logic, all of them being purely formal knowledge. The significance of formal thought and its power of affording *a priori* cognitions is Kant's peculiar problem.

It is generally conceded that Kant solved Hume's problem, but he failed to solve his own.

By a strange misapprehension of the nature of form and its non-objectivity, he has switched off into an idealism (so called by himself) which it will be hard to distinguish from that subjectivism which he assumed Berkeley's philosophy to be. The difference between the two (in Kant's opinion) consists in this, that according to Kant, the world itself is real but in the form in which it represents itself in space and time it is phenomenal, while he declares that according to Berkeley the world itself is "illusory appearance." Further Kant insists that the world as appearance, though purely phenomenal, is not an arbitrary illusion, but governed by laws which render it necessary in all its details.

The great merit of Kant is his wonderfully keen discrimination between the purely formal and the sensory, showing that the former is throughout universal and necessary in its principles, while the latter is incidental and concrete or particular; but he fails to apply the same discrimination to his conception of experience and to the objects of experience, and thus he limits the formal to the subject, while it is obviously the universal feature of all existence, objective as well as subjective, constituting between them the connecting link that makes science, i. e., objective cognition, possible.

Before we examine Kant's position, we must first discuss, at least briefly, Hume's problem and offer the solution in the form which Kant, in our opinion, ought to have given it. It will then be easy to point out the error that led him astray and prevented him from offering a definite and final doctrine as to the nature of form which should become the basis of all scientific inquiry, and enable philosophy to become a science as definite, or nearly so, as are mathematics and logic, or even physics.

HUME'S PROBLEM.

Locke objected to the doctrine of innate ideas, claiming that all ideas were the products of sense-impressions, and he excepted only one idea, viz., the principle of necessary connexion, i. e., causality. Hume accepted Locke's sensualism, but, endeavoring to be more consistent, drew its last consequence by denying even the idea of cause and effect as a necessary connexion. He argued that we meet with constant conjunctions in experience, but not with necessity. By habit we are compelled to expect that upon every cause its due effect will follow, but there is no reason to assume that causation is due to a universal and necessary law of objective validity. Hume saw in the relation between cause and effect a synthesis, calling it "the sequence of two objects"; and if it were a synthesis, or a mere sequence, he would be right that the connexion between cause and effect is accidental and our belief in its necessity a mere habit.

The truth is that causation is not a sequence of two objects following one another, but one process, a motion, or a change of place; and the simplest kind of motion implies that there are at least three phases or states of things in the system in which the motion takes place: first the original condition (which for simplicity's sake we may assume to be in a relative equilibrium); secondly, the motion disturbing the equilibrium so as to make one or several elements in the system seek new places; and thirdly, the new adjustment (which for simplicity's sake we will again regard as being in equilibrium). The first phase is called the conditions or circumstances, the second is the cause, and the third the effect. Cause and effect are not combined into a unity by the compulsion of a law of necessary connexion; they are two phases of one and the same process. The duality is a product of abstraction; the unity of the two is the original fact, and we know now that causality is but another expression for the law of the conservation of matter and energy. The naturalist assumes that matter and energy are indestructible, and thus every process that takes place in nature is only a transformation. Accordingly, our belief in causation is after all, although Hume denied it, finally based upon the logical principle of identity $A = A$. It is an extension of this principle to a state of motion.

Cause, accordingly, is never an object, but always an event, viz., a motion of some kind. We cannot call the bullet the cause, and death the effect; or mercury the cause, and paralysis the effect; or worse still (as says George Lewes) that whiskey, water, sugar and lemon are the causes of punch.

We distinguish between cause and reason, reason being the law under which a single event is subsumed for the sake of explaining the effectiveness of the cause.[1]

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[1] The instinct of language has here proved wiser than the scholarship of philosophers. All European languages (the Greek, the Latin, together with its derivatives the French, Italian, etc., the German, the English) distinguish between "*αἰτία, causa, Ursache* (from the same root as the English verb 'to seek') cause," and "*ἀρχή*, (i. e.. first principle) *ratio*, *Grund*, reason," the former being the particular incident that starts a process, the latter the *raison d'être*, the principle, or general rule, the natural law that explains it. When the two ideas are confounded, as has been done frequently by philosophers, the greatest confusion results, leading to such self-contradictory notions as "*causa sui*," "first cause," "ultimate cause," etc., which lead either to agnosticism or to mysticism. For further details

Kant, following the suggestion of Hume, devoted special attention to the problem of causality, but he solved it by simply declaring that it was a concept *a priori*, and thus belonged to the same class of truths as mathematical, arithmetical, and logical theorems. He never attempted to explain its truth, let alone to prove it, or to demonstrate its universality and necessity. Mathematicians deem it necessary to prove their theorems, but Kant, strange to say, neglected to deduce the law of causation from simpler truths or analyse it into its elements. If Kant had made attempts to analyse causation for the sake of proving its validity after the fashion of logicians and mathematicians, he might, with his keen insight into the nature of physical laws and natural sciences, have anticipated the discovery of the law of the conservation of matter and energy, and might furthermore have been preserved from the error of his subjectivism which affected the whole system of his thought and twisted his philosophy out of shape.

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant's position remains unintelligible; we understand his arguments and may even approve the several statements from which they proceed, but we are astonished at the boldness of the conclusion, and fail to be convinced. His objections to the belief in space and time as objective things hold good only if space and time are assumed to be things or objects; but not if they are thought to be mere forms of objects. They are thinkable as forms of thought not less than as forms of objects. When assumed to be solely forms of thought to the exclusion of the idea that there are any objective relations corresponding to them, they become mysterious and quite mystical, and here lies the reason why Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is actually mystifying. He bewilders the reader. We become acquainted with his argument, but do not feel sure that we have rightly apprehended his meaning. In the *Prolegomena* Kant is, at least, not unintelli-

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see the author's *Primer of Philosophy*, the chapter on Causation, pp. 30–34, and *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 29–30.

gible. The *Prolegomena* are not deductive, but inductive. In them Kant leads us the way he travelled himself, and this is the reason of the importance of the *Prolegomena*. Kant embodied their contents in various places into the second edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the passages are scattered and lose the plainness and power which they possess in the context of the *Prolegomena*. Here we are face to face with Kant as a man; he gives us a personal reply, as if he were interviewed; and while we grant the significance of transcendentalism and the truth of many of his observations and deductions, we can at the same time understand how he arrived at errors. We can lay our finger on the very spot where he went astray, and I cannot but wonder at the courage of this undaunted thinker who abided by the consequences of an apparently trivial fallacy, due to the neglect to investigate one feature of the problem to which he devoted many years of his life in profound reflexion and close study.

Kant was puzzled that we could know anything *a priori* concerning the formal constitution of things. The celestial bodies obey laws which man develops out of his mind. That the highest (i. e., the most general or universal) laws of nature should happen to be the same as the highest (i. e., the formal) laws of the thinking mind, and yet should be of an independent origin, seemed absurd to Kant. He saw only two possibilities; either, he said, we have derived our formal knowledge from the things by experience, or we ourselves have put it into the things to which it really does not belong. The former possibility is excluded, because, says Kant (*Prolegomena*, § 9), "The properties of a thing cannot migrate into my faculty of representation," while on the other hand the purely formal truths are not derived from experience, but produced by the mind as cognitions *a priori*. Thus, Kant accepts the other horn of the dilemma, declaring (*Prolegomena*, § 36) that our faculty of cognition does not conform to the objects, but contrariwise, that the objects conform to cognition. Objects, he claimed, do not in themselves possess form, but our mind is so constituted that it cannot help attributing form and everything formal to the object of our experience.

IDEALITY NOT SUBJECTIVITY.

Now, it is true that our purely formal notions of mathematical and logical truths are ideal (made of the stuff that ideas consist of), but being purely formal they are definitely determined, that is to say that, wherever the same constructions are made, either by the operations of other minds or of natural conditions in the facts of objective reality, they will be found to be the same. Thus, our mental constructions can reconstruct the processes and formations of nature, and we can learn to predetermine the course of natural events.

Kant did not see that form might be a property of all existence and that, in that case, the purely formal in things would be of the same nature as the purely formal in man's mind. It is true that the properties of things do not migrate from the objects into the subject, but they make impressions upon the senses and these several impressions possess analogies to the qualities by which they are caused. The analogies between matter and sensation seem much more arbitrary than those between the shapes of things and the outlines of our sense-images. Nevertheless even here we grant that the reduction of the latter to universal laws is purely subjective, for there are no laws, *qua* formulated laws, in the objective world; there are only uniformities. But if we understand by the term law a description of uniformities we must see at once that there are objective realities (or rather features of reality) corresponding to our correct notions of the several formal laws.

If the uniformities of nature are not transferred to the mind directly, but if the purely formal concepts are developed independently of sense-experience *a priori*, how is it possible that the two present the wonderful agreement that puzzled Kant?

Nature is throughout activity, and so is our existence. Nature is constantly combining and separating; we observe transformations; things move about; and their constituent parts change places. Similar operations are inalienable functions of the mind. The subtlest analysis as well as the most complicated composition and every investigation, be it ever so intricate, are mere combinations and separations, activities given together with our existence.

The arguments of Kant by which he proves the apriority of purely formal laws must be granted to be true. The source of all purely formal thought is the mind, and not sense-perceptions. They are ideal. But the mind has been built up by experience, viz., by sense-impressions of different but definite forms, and the formal order of objective nature is the mould in which the mind has been formed. The brute cannot as yet analyse sensations into their forms and materials, i. e., into the purely relational and the purely sensory features; but man can; and when he has acquired the power of abstraction he can build models of forms, exhausting the entire scope of all possible cases, and these models serve him as examples of the several analogous formations of nature. Accordingly, our mental constitution, though a subjective construction, is built up with materials quarried from the formal uniformities of objective nature. Thus the spider undoubtedly weaves his web from his own bodily self, but the materials have first been deposited there by nature. Man's mind is not less than the spider's silken thread, produced by, and remaining a part and an expression of, that great All-Being in which all creatures live and move and have their being.

There is this difference between the spider's web and formal thought: the former consists of matter, the pure forms of mathematical, logical, and other ideas are immaterial; they are abstracts made of the purely relational features of sense-impressions. They are ideal, viz., mental pictures, and as such they are subjective. But they are not purely subjective. The sensory part of a retinal image is purely subjective, but the formal preserves in a reduced size the projection of the shape of the object. Form belongs to the object as well as to its subjective image, and thus the subjective conception of form possesses an objective value.

Everything ideal is subjective, but it need not be purely subjective. Because the rational is ideal, it by no means follows that it is not, and cannot be, objective.

When we construct some purely formal configuration with our nature-given mental operations, it will be the same as any other construction which has been made in the same way, be it in the domain either of things or of other minds. Nature performs the same operations which appear in man's mental activity. Man being a part of existence, what is more natural than that his bodily and mental constitution partakes of the same form as all the other parts of the world that surrounds him?

A great and important part of our knowledge consists of purely formal theorems; they are *a priori.* And these purely formal theorems contain actual information concerning the formal aspect of the real world. And why? Because they are systematic reconstructions of the formal features of reality by imitating operations of motion which take place throughout the universe.

All formal theorems have a general application, hence, whenever applicable, they afford *a priori* information and can be employed as a key to unlock the mysteries of the unknown.

By the rule of three we calculate the distance from the earth to the sun, and map out the paths of the several celestial bodies.

When Kant says: Our mind "dictates" certain laws to the objects of experience, he uses a wrong expression or takes a poetical license seriously. The mind "dictates" nothing to reality. Reality including its form is such as it is independently of what we think it to be. That which Kant calls dictating is a mere determining, a description, implying at the same time a foretelling or predicting of natural events which (as we saw) is done by constructing in our mind analogous models. The agreement between our model and reality proves only that the scheme on which the model has been constructed is correct; it does not prove that the model does any dictating. The model dictates as little to reality as a barometer dictates what air-pressure there is to be in the atmosphere.

THE FORMAL AND THE SENSORY.

While we must object to Kant's doctrine that everything ideal is subjective and that what is directly derived from the mind cannot be objective, we must not (with the Sensualists) place the formal and the sensual on the same level. Kant is right that space and time are not objects or things or entities; they are forms, and as forms they possess the quality of being empty. There is no particularity about them anywhere. Thus, space is space anywhere; it is not like matter, denser here and looser there; nor like energy, here intense, there weak. Considered in itself, space is the mere potentiality of existence. It is a description of the condition of granting motion to move in all directions. Its very indifference and absence of anything particular implies uniformity; and thus the laws of potentiality (i. e., the qualities of possible forms) are mere schedules; they are empty in themselves, but possess universal application.[1]

The formal aspect of reality is its suchness; the material element is its thisness. All suchness can be formulated in general, and even in universal, descriptions; all thisness is individual and particular. Statements of a general nature, such as are formulated by employing the methods of formal thought, are not single and concrete facts, but omnipresent and eternal laws; they are true or untrue, correct or incorrect. Facts of thisness are always in a special time and in a special spot in space. They are definite *nunc* and *hic*, not a *semper* and *ubique*. They are not true or untrue, but real or unreal.

The essential feature of things is their form; for their form, which is their suchness, viz., their external shape as well as internal structure, constitutes their character, their soul, their spiritual significance, making them what they are. Their thisness is their concrete presence which actualises the thing as a stubborn fact of the material universe.

It is true that the sense-pictures in which the world is represented to us are subjective; they are appearances or phenomena; it is further true that these pictures are radically different from the things which they represent. The color-sensation red has no similarity (as Kant rightly observes) to the physical qualities of vermillion; and physicists have sufficiently penetrated into the constitution of matter of any kind (though most of the problems remain still unsolved) to convince us that matter as it is in itself is radically different from the subjective picture as which it presents itself to the senses. But the scientist assumes form to be objective, and all the theories as to the constitution of matter, in chemistry as well as in the several branches of physics, are based on the principle of eliminating the subjective element, that is to say, the properly sensory ingredients of our experience, by reducing them to statements in purely formal terms, which is done by measuring, by counting, by weighing, by defining their proportions, by describing their shape and structure, by determining their relations; and if we have succeeded in doing so, we claim to have understood the objective nature of things. How can Kant's statement be upheld, that the sensation red is not an objective quality of vermillion? Is it not because physics has taught us that difference of color depends upon a difference of wave-length in ether vibration? Kant's argument is based upon a tacit but indispensable recognition of the objectivity of form and formal qualities.

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[1] These truths have been felt by philosophers of all nations, and it is surprising to find them in the writings of Lao-Tze and the Buddhist scriptures, in both of which the absence of materiality, the not-being, plays an important part and is endowed with religious sanctity.

Therefore, while granting that the sense-begotten world-picture of our intuition is subjective appearance we claim in contrast to Kant that its formal elements represent a feature that inheres in existence as the form of existence.

In making form purely subjective, Kant changes—notwithstanding his protestations—all ideas, all thoughts, all science, into purely subjective conceits. He is more of an idealist than Berkeley. Science can be regarded as an objective method of cognition only if the laws of form are objective features of reality.

THE MORAL ASPECT.

An incidental remark on the moral aspect of the contrast between the purely formal and the sensory would not seem out of place here. Man has risen from the sensual plane into the abstract realms of reason, and morality becomes possible only by man's ability to make general principles the basis of his actions. Thus it happens that at a certain period of man's development the sensory is regarded as the lower, and generalisations with what they imply, ideals, maxims, abstract thought, as the higher. The sensory is thus discriminated against and even denounced as the enemy of the spiritual. Hence the dualistic phase in the religious and philosophical evolution of mankind in which sensuality is branded as sin and salvation sought in asceticism, i. e., the mortification of the body.

We must consider, however, that the contrast between form and matter, general law and particular existence, the ideal and sensory, spirit and matter, does not imply a contradictory antithesis, let alone any hostility or exclusivity of the two. That the spiritual, viz., the conception of the purely formal with reason and its generalisations, develops only on a higher plane, cannot be used to incriminate the sensory and the bodily. On the contrary, the spiritual justifies the sensory and points out the higher aims which it can attain.

And how indispensable is the sensory in religion! Consider but love, so much insisted on by the preachers of almost all higher faiths. Is it not even in its present form a sentiment, i. e., a sensory emotion? The truth is that morality consists in the sanctification of the sensory, not in its eradication; and sanctification means setting aside and devoting to a special purpose, to the exclusion of a general use. Particularity is the nature of bodily existence and particularity demands exclusiveness. Any general use of bodily functions will prostitute them. Reason, on the contrary, is meant for general use and can never suffer from a general application.

Kant's conception of morality is based upon reason, to the exclusion of sentiment. Reason makes action according to principles or maxims possible, and all those maxims are moral which can become universally established. Thus the basis of ethics is the golden rule, pronounced by Confucius, Christ, and other religious leaders of mankind. Lao-Tze says of the sage: "His methods invite requital."[1]

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[1] *Tao-Teh-King*, Chapter 30.

FORM BOTH SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE.

We believe we have satisfactorily explained the problem of the *a priori*, of the purely formal, which puzzled Kant; we have further shown how and why the laws of purely formal thought agree with the highest laws of nature; why being devoid of particularity they are universal (implying necessity); and there remains only to be pointed out that the validity of science rests upon the assurance of the identity of the subjective and the objective laws of form. Form, being common to both domains, the objectivity of things and the subjectivity of the mind, serves as a bridge on which cognition can advance into the unknown realms of objective existence, and thus the formal sciences constitute our organ of cognition, the objective reliability of which depends upon form's being an objective feature of things.

It goes without saying that all that Kant says concerning their infinity, uniqueness, universality, and necessity as being against the belief that space and time are objects or things holds good; it proves that they are forms. Yet though they must not be regarded as objects, they are objective; they are the forms of intuition but also of the objects intuited. Further, what Kant says (relying on symmetry as intuitively perceived) to prove that they are forms of intuitions and not concepts, holds as well to prove that they are sighted forms of existence, not internally hidden qualities of a stuffy, thingish nature to be distilled from sense-perception in the alembic of the observation before its existence can be known. It is true that the world as it appears to us is a sense-woven, subjective picture; things as we perceive them are phenomena. Further, our concepts, including the world-conception of science, which is built up with the help of the purely formal laws of thought, is a mental construction; they are noumena. Both worlds, that of sense and that of thought, are subjective; but they represent reality; the senses picture the world in the beauteous glow of sensations, and the mind describes it in the exact measures of formal determinations; but the latter, if true, offers an objectively valid model of the constitution of things, explaining their suchness without, however, giving any information as to the nature of reality in itself, i. e., what matter is in itself; whether it is eternal or not; why it exists; and if it came into being, or how it happened to originate. It is obvious that things are not matter, but matter of a definite form; the form is cognisable, while matter is simply the indication of their concrete reality as objects in the objective world.

SUBJECTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF OBJECTIVE VALIDITY.

Kant in discriminating between empirical perception (viz., the sense-impressions possessing only subjective validity) and experience (viz., the product of sense-impressions worked out by the *a priori* methods of pure reason imparting to our judgments universality and necessity)[1] goes far in refuting himself and his pet theory. He speaks of universality and necessity as the only means by which the subjective elements can become objectively valid. He claims, e. g., to "have amply shown that they (the concepts of the pure understanding, causality, including also mathematics, etc.) and the theorems derived from them are firmly established *a priori*, or before all experience, and *have their undoubted objective value*, though only with regard to experience."

If the concepts of the pure understanding have objective value, why are they not objective? Why must they be regarded as purely subjective? We grant the strength of Kant's argument that, being unequivocally creations of the mind independent of sense-experience, or, as Kant calls them, *a priori*, they are subjective. But is not the question legitimate that they may be at once subjective and objective? Kant disposes of this question too quickly, and here lies his mistake: instead of investigating how certain uniformities of law may be at once indigenously subjective, i. e., originated by purely mental operations, and at the same time objective, i. e., actualised by the operations of material bodies in the concrete world of real existence, he jumps at the conclusion that all things ideal are necessarily purely subjective. The ideal, viz., all that belongs to the realm of ideas, is subjective, but it has objective validity, and that which gives it objective validity is the mind's power of forming universal and necessary judgments. In fact, the terms universal and necessary would have no sense if they were limited to the realm of subjectivity and if objective validity did not imply true objectivity. Hence our aim is to explain the correspondence between the subjective and the objective, and we come to the conclusion that the *a priori* judgments are based upon the conditions of pure form, and form is a quality of the object as well as of the subject.

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[1] *Prolegomena*, § 2 ff.

Thus while Kant's doctrine implies that

> the forms of intuition (space and time) and the formal laws are *a priori* in the mind; therefore they are purely subjective and the intuiting and thinking subject transfers them upon the objective world;

our position is the reverse.

What Kant calls *a priori* is purely formal; therefore the mind can produce its laws and theorems by purely mental operations, yet at the same time, being purely formal, they apply to objective reality as the formal conditions of all objects, and thus the operations of objects, as far as their formal conditions are concerned, bear a close analogy to the *a priori* theorems.

We construct the purely formal in our mind, but we do not create it. Nor are the propositions of mathematics a quality of space. We do not deduce the Pythagorean theorem from space, but we construct a right-angled triangle and investigate the results of our construction. Accordingly the theorems thus evolved are products of our mental operations executed on conditions given in our space conception. There are no mathematical theorems in the stellar universe, but there are conditions in the starry heavens which make it possible to calculate distances or other relations with the help of arithmetical computations and geometric constructions. And the conditions which make this possible can only be the objectivity of form implying that the *a priori* laws of subjective form as constructed in our mental models possess an objective validity.

THE OBJECTIVE ANALOGUES OF MENTAL CONSTRUCTIONS.

Zeno's paradox and the difficulties which Clifford found in the continuity conception of space, it seems to me, arise from a direct identification of the mental construction of space with the objective formal features of things that constitute what may be called objective space. Objective space is an inherent quality of things as the relational of their parts and is not, as in subjective space, a construction. The path of a body can be represented by a mathematical line, and a line is infinitely divisible; but for that reason it is not composed of infinite parts. Nor has a moving body to construct a line of an infinite number of infinitely minute parts by adding them piecemeal. The mental analysis and construction of a line is different from traversing it. For moving over a definite stretch of ground it is not necessary to go through the process of separately adding the imaginary infinitely small parts of which it is supposed to consist and into which it may be divided. It has not actually been divided, it is only infinitely divisible.

It is true that time (as time) is purely subjective, but there is a reality that corresponds to time. Time is the measure of motion. We count the running sand of the hour-glass, we divide the face of the sun-dial, we build a clock to determine the lapse of time. There is no time (as time) in the objective world, but there are motions, such as the revolutions of the earth round its axis, or round the sun, and these motions possess succession with definite duration, rendering time, viz., their determination, possible. Duration with succession of events in the world of things is the objective equivalent of time. The measurement of time is a subjective device.

The same is true of space as a conception of the extended world of things. There is no space conception in things, but bodies are extended; and their relation among themselves is an arrangement of innumerable juxtapositions. Extension, juxtaposition, direction of motion, is the objective quality of things that corresponds to the purely mental concept of space.

The untrained and philosophically crude man transfers subjective conceptions of things directly upon the objective world. He speaks of light and colors, of sounds, of time and numbers and things as existing outside of his mind; but a close inspection of the origin of mind will teach us to discriminate between sound and air waves, between colors and the cause of colors (produced by a commotion in the ether,—a reality whose existence is directly imperceptible and can only be deduced indirectly by argument). We shall learn by reflexion that geometrical lines are purely mental constructions, but that the paths of the stars possess qualities (viz., all those which depend upon purely formal conditions) that closely correspond to the conic sections of mathematics.

Further, it becomes obvious that our division of the world into separate things is artificial, for things are only clusters of predicates which impress us as being units. The truth is that the world is so constituted as to render a perfect separation impossible. Things are in a perpetual flux, and the limits between them are arbitrary. As the whole atmosphere and its pressure belong to our lungs, so the gravity of the sun is an integral part of the weight of the earth. Thus we can truly say that there are no separate things except in our minds where they are artificial divisions invented for the practical purpose of describing the world, of mapping out its parts, of comprehending its actions and having a means of adjusting ourselves to our surroundings.

Logic is purely mental, but there is something in the objective world that tallies with logic; we call it natural law, but the term law is misleading. There are no laws in nature, but only uniformities resulting from the condition that the purely formal is the same everywhere and that the same formal conditions will produce the same formal effects.

Purely formal laws are universally valid only as purely formal laws. Twice two will be four in all arithmetical systems of any possible rational being, and the statement is universally valid so far as pure forms are concerned. If we deal with actualities possessed of additional qualities where multiplication ceases to have its strict mathematical sense, the statement will no longer be tenable. The accumulation of power on a definite occasion may have results that cannot be calculated by addition or multiplication. The associated wealth of twice two millions may far exceed four millions; and twice one half will never be one when we deal with living organisms. All this is conceded. Ideal operations are purely mental and as such subjective, but for all that they possess objective validity which implies that there are objective features exhibiting close analogies, by being products of a fundamental sameness of conditions. This fundamental sameness is the universality of form which is common to both the domain of the objective world and the ideal realm of the mind, the thinking subject.

There are neither categories nor classes in the objective world, but the different modes of existence are classified by sentient beings and the scheme of the classification is the result. A reflexion upon our modes of thought objectifies them as modes of existence. The Platonic ideas, i. e., the eternal types of the various beings, do not possess a concrete existence as do, e. g., the moulds of a potter, but there are uniformities among the living forms which are obviously apparent. The doctrine of evolution proves that the lines of division between the types of beings are not so distinct in reality as they seem to be, and before a strictly scientific inspection they fade away as imaginary; yet they remain and are indispensable for our method of classification; and the unities which they represent justify us in speaking of objective features as corresponding to the mental conception of Platonic ideas.

THE ORIGIN OF GENERALISATIONS.

The sense-impressions of things are registered according to their difference of form. Every sense-impression runs along in the groove prepared for it by a former sense-impression. Thus the same is registered with the same, and similar ones are correlated. The result is a systematisation of sensory impressions, and the relations that obtain in this system which is built up in the natural course of growth, may appropriately be compared to the pigeon-holes of a methodically arranged cabinet. The difference between the cabinet with pigeon-holes and the human mind is this, that the former is artificial, the latter natural. The human mind with its rationality has been developed according to mechanical law and the classification of sense-impressions is done by it as automatically as the distribution of the different letters in a type-distributing machine.

Our ideas, our names of things, our system of classification, are purely subjective, but there is an objective analogue of the eternal types, which consists in the uniformities of all possible formations. This is true of living creatures as well as of machines and other concepts of human fancy. In the domain of invention we know very well that the inventor sometimes creates a combination of parts never actualised before on earth; but the inventor is a finder: he is as much a discoverer as Columbus who found a new continent, or the scientist who succeeds in formulating an unknown law. America existed before Columbus, the law of gravitation held good before Newton, and the idea of a steam engine was a realisable combination before James Watts. It is a feature of objective existence that certain functions can be performed in perfectly definite interrelations. Such conditions which are actualised by a certain combination and disappear as soon as the combination is destroyed, are the objective features in things which justify the subjective idea of unities finding expression in concepts of things and beings.

THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON.

Kant grants the objective applicability of the categories, but he denies the validity of the ideas of pure reason, especially the cosmological, the psychological, and the theological idea. We are unable to follow Kant and are inclined to consider his three ideas of Pure Reason in the same light as time and space and the categories. The concept of unity is not a mere assumption but it has its correspondent analogue in reality[1] and has its practical use; only we must beware of treating unities as concrete objectivities, as separate and discrete entities, as things in themselves which have an objective existence apart from and independently of their constituent parts. Thus the soul of man is as real on the assumption of an ego entity as on the theory of its denial. Life is as true whether or not vitalism can be established. The world is a great interrelated system, whether or not the uniformities of nature are called laws. There is a creation of the world, a formation of its life, a dispensation of its destinies, taking place, whether or not this ultimate norm of being be called God; the facts of the cosmic order remain the same on the assumptions of both theism and atheism. But obviously, this decision is not an endorsement of Kant's antinomies, but an explanation of his reasons for formulating them.

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[1] Thus not only all organisms are unities, but also steam-engines, dynamos, or any machinery that would not work unless it were constructed of interacting parts in a definite way.

While we grant that there is a reality corresponding to Kant's three ideas of pure reason, we do not mean to say that there is a God such as the crude belief of an untrained mind represents him to be, nor further that there is a soul such as it is assumed to exist in the annals of superstition, nor finally that the crude notions of a cosmos, the limits of the world or its infinitude, its composition, its determinedness, and its absolute existence, should be such as abstract reason might arbitrarily construct: we only mean to say that there are factors in life which caused man to construct such mental images or ideas as are called God, soul, and world. The ideas may be wrong, but the factors which produced them are real, and the duty devolves upon theology, psychology, and cosmology to eliminate error and bring out the truth.

My objection to Kant's doctrine is not an objection to his terminology nor to idealism in general. We may form our world-view in an idealistic as well as a realistic nomenclature. Object may mean either the sense-woven picture or the outside thing which it signifies. We may say that the objective world is ideal, for such it is, meaning by objects the things as we see them. We may say that the objective world is real, meaning by objects the actual things represented in our sense-images. The nomenclature of a philosophical system is important but it is arbitrary. We may criticise it as impractical, but we cannot on its account reject a philosophy as untrue.

REALISM OR IDEALISM.

We object to Kant's doctrine of limiting form to the subject and thus denying the objective value of the ideal. We may define terms as we please, but we must remain consistent. If the objects are ideal, I gladly grant that the forms of the objects are ideal; but for all that, being forms of the objects, they are objective, as much as the objects themselves.

The sense-woven pictures of things, though subjective images, are the realities of life, and our concepts of things are symbols of them in terms of their formal features expressed according to schedules which we construct *a priori.* Time and space, the forms of our sense-world (of our *Anschauung*), accordingly are as real as these things, and I cannot say that the things themselves are real while the forms of things are purely ideal, i. e., not real.

Schopenhauer, a one-sided but nevertheless one of the most prominent and faithful disciples of Kant, defends Kantian idealism against the misinterpretations of the so-called realists in these sentences:

> "In spite of all that one may say, nothing is so persistently and ever anew misunderstood as *Idealism*, because it is interpreted as meaning that one denies the *empirical* reality of the external world. Upon this rests the perpetual return to the appeal to common sense, which appears in many forms and guises; for example, as an 'irresistible conviction' in the Scotch school, or as Jacobi's *faith* in the reality of the external world. The external world by no means presents itself, as Jacobi declares, upon credit, and is accepted by us upon trust and faith. It presents itself as that which it is, and performs directly what it promises."[1]

THE SUBJECT AS ITS OWN OBJECT.

The quarrel between the idealists so called and the realists of Jacobi's stamp is purely a question of terminology. It is a vicious circle to ask whether the real is real; the question is, "What do we understand by real?" Now we agree with Kant in accepting *Anschauung* as real. Our perceptions are the data of experience, they are the facts of life about which there is no quibbling and the question of unreality originates only in the realm of abstract thought, viz., in the domain of interpretation. Perceptions are classified; perceptions of the same kind are subsumed under the general conception of their class and if a perception is misinterpreted, our notion concerning it is erroneous. An after-image is as real as the original perception, but it is called an illusion when it suggests the presence of an object; in other words when its cause is misinterpreted.

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[1] From Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Idea.*

Perceptions accordingly are what we define as real, and space and time are, abstractly stated, the forms of perception. Time and space, accordingly, are as real as perceptions.

Now we may ask what are the objects of the perceptions, defining objects this time not as the sense-woven images of our perception inside our senses, but as the external presences which are supposed to cause them. Since it is impossible here to enter into a detailed epistemological discussion of the subject, we state the answer for brevity's sake dogmatically as follows: The objects (viz., the external presences which are supposed to cause perceptions) are, ultimately, i. e., in their inmost constitution, of the same nature as are the perceptions themselves. The perceptions in their totality are called the subject—which is a sentient body, an intricate organism consisting of different organs of sense and a superadded organ of thought for preserving the sense-images, collating them, classifying them, and interpreting them. We are a system of perceptions and impulses, guided by memories and thoughts, but we represent ourselves in our own perception as a body in time and space. Thus our representation of ourselves is our self-perception, i. e., a representation of the subject as its own object, and our self-perception is as real as are perceptions in general. Succession of sense-impressions and reactions thereupon, accordingly, form part and parcel of our subject as its own object; and in the same way, juxtaposition of organs is an attribute of our self, not as it is as a subject in itself, but of our self as it represents itself as its own object. Other objects are in the same predicament and partake of the same nature. If time and space are the forms of objectified subject, viz., of our own bodily existence, we have good reasons to ascribe objectivity to the facts from which the ideas of time and space are derived, viz., to extension and succession.

THE OBJECTIVE ORIGIN OF SPACE AND TIME.

It is true that the factors which generate in the mind our conceptions of time and space, together with the entire formal aspect of being, lie in the subject, in the sentient thinking being, but they lie not in the abstract subject in itself, not in the subjectivity of the subject, not in the quality of the subject which remains when all other qualities, i. e., the objective features of its own actualisation as a concrete being, are omitted by the process of abstraction, i. e., when they have been cancelled in thought. The subject in itself will be found to be an empty generalisation which contains nothing but a product of our analysis of perception, the bare idea of the perceiving in contrast to the perceived. It contains nothing either *a priori* or *a posteriori;* merely itself, the shadow of a thing. But the actual subject, which is an object in the objective world, exists somewhere in space and in a given time. It moves, i. e., it changes its position. It consists of juxtaposed organs and its experiences exhibit a definite succession, each act having its own definite duration. Therefore we do not hesitate, when drawing a line of demarcation between the subjective and the objective features of the thinking subject, to include its form together with its bodily objectivation in the realm of objectivity. In this way it happens that time and space may be called subjective, because the objectified subject finds them *a priori* in itself, but their ultimate root lies in the domain of objectivity, and we can therefore just as well call them objective, because they are the forms of the objective world and originate in the subject only because it is an object belonging to the objective world.

UNIVERSALITY DUE TO SYSTEMATISATION.

Kant was puzzled mainly by the subjective apriority of the laws of time and space and of all other formal relations, but this puzzling apriority is, closely considered, nothing but their general applicability to all possible experience, which is due to the fact that all formal relations admit of systematisation. Formal possibilities can be exhausted and purely formal statements apply to *all* pure forms. Hence they possess universality, and universality admits of no exception, hence it implies necessity, which involves *a priori* applicability.

It is true (as Kant says) that purely formal knowledge is empty; but we know at the same time that the purely formal knowledge gives system to the empirical, to the sense-given facts of our experience. If we could not classify sense-impressions, they would remain a useless chaos, and human reason would not have developed. Kant expresses this truth by saying that the sensory impressions without the guidance of the purely formal are blind.

But as the formative norms of the objective world shape things and make them such as they are, our formal cognition classifies sense-impression according to their forms and thus makes a knowledge of objects possible. Our formal cognition is not the cause of the objective uniformities (as Kant suggests) but one of their applications only, being, as it were, their own reflexion in the consciousness of a sentient being. By being systematised in the shape of formulas, they apply *a priori* to experience and become in this way a key, with the help of which we can unlock the closed doors of the mysteries of nature and decipher the riddles of the universe.

THE REAL AND THE SUPERREAL.

We may call the eternal norms of existence which condition the formation of things "being" or "*Sein*" and the concrete actualisation of the types of being their "becoming," *Werden* or *Dasein.* We become acquainted with the norms of existence, part of which are formulated as natural laws, by abstraction and generalisation, but for that reason they are not mere glittering generalities, abstract nonentities, or unreal inventions, but significant features of objective existence, depicting not accidental but necessary uniformities. While we concede that the world of becoming is real, we must grant that the realm of being is superreal. Both *Sein* and *Werden,* Being and Becoming, are real; but the reality of the two is different in kind. The latter's reality is actualisation, the reality of the former is eternality. Thus the former is immutable, the latter a perpetual flux. The fleeting realities of sense are definite objects in the objective world, but the norms of eternal being are the formative factors which shape them.

Obviously the eternal norms of existence, which are identical with the purely formal laws constituting the cosmic order, though not material facts, are the most effective presences of the world. They are not only real, they are superreal. They remain the same whether realised or not in the actual world. They produce the cosmic order, render the rise of rational beings possible, they are the condition of the intelligibility of things, they are the prototype of mind and spirituality, they are the corner-stone of both science and ethics and constitute Kant's *mundus intelligibilis*—the realm of spiritual being; Swedenborg's sphere of spirits, of angels, and archangels; the kingdom of God, to be realised on earth; yea, God himself, for God is all these norms in their totality and systematic unity. In Lao-Tze's philosophy it is the eternal Tao, the world-reason or primordial Logos. In Buddhist metaphysics it corresponds to Açvaghosha's Tathâgatagarbha, i. e., the womb of Buddhahood and the origin of all things; to Amitâbha, the source of all light and wisdom, and also to the deathless, the uncreate, the non-corporeal existence (*arûpa*), the Nirvâna of the older Buddhists.

NOUMENA.

The data of experience are sensations, or sense-perceptions, which represent themselves as images of things in time and space. The sensory element of the images, which is conditioned by the material composition of the sentient subject, is purely subjective and need not be uniform. Thus we know that colors are perceived differently by different eyes; the color-blind see the world like a steel-engraving, or rather a wash-picture, gray in gray. To the red-blind red appears green, to the green-blind red appears dark yellow and green pale yellow. If all men were color-blind, the gray image would have to be regarded as normal. The forms of things, too, are conditioned to some extent by the material composition of our sense-organs, as much so as the picture on the sensitive plate of a photographer's camera depends upon the lens. Further, we see not things as they are, but as they are projected according to the laws of perspective. But we can from the given data of the projected images and additional considerations of other data of experience reconstruct the form and structure of things as they are in space and of the events as they and their accelerations take place in time. This construction of things is called in Kant's terminology things as creations of thought, or noumena, and the noumena are intended as models of the objects themselves, for they mean to depict things in their objective nature, as they are after the elimination of all subjective elements of cognition. Accordingly noumena (as noumena) are scientific notions, products of reasoning, and subjective in a higher degree even than sense-perceptions. They are the interpretations of the sense-perceptions and are as such ideal, i. e., representations not things. But they represent things as they are, independent of the senses of the sentient subject. Noumena would be unmeaning, if they did not represent objective realities, if they were purely fictitious, if they did not portray the things as objects in the objective world. We may fitly call the realities for whose designation noumena (i. e., scientific concepts) have been invented objects, or more definitely, objects in themselves.

They constitute the realm of experience, and time and space are the generalised modes of their existence by which we determine their formal qualities. Nothing is real in the sense of concrete existence, except it be in time and space. Accordingly time and space (though not objects but mere forms) are objective qualities of things, and without time and space concrete things cease to be concretely real and become either mere ideas or nonentities.

We may with Kant distinguish between thing and thing in itself and may understand by the latter the eternal foundation of the thing, its metaphysical *raison d'être*, whatever that may mean (either its Platonic idea, its eternal type, or the Schopenhauerian conception of its "will to be," or the general and abstract idea of its existence), but under all conditions space and time belong (as Kant says) to the things as appearances, viz., the things as objects in the objective world which implies (the contrary to that which Kant says) that they are not purely subjective, but objective.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF SPACE AND TIME.

Now we may call the perpetual flux of concrete objects "appearance," and the domain of eternal being "the real things": in that case the real things come to appearance by becoming actual in time and space. In this sense we agree with Kant, that time and space are real for our experience, though not for our experience alone, but for any experience. Every sentient subject, in so far as it is sentient, every individual man, is not a subject pure and simple, but an actualised subject, an objectified thing, for all acts of cognition are acts of an objective significance, taking place in the domain of objective existence, as an interrelation between two or several objects. One party to this interrelation (viz., my bodily organisation) happens to be the sentient and thinking subject, but that alters nothing in the case, for all its actions take place in time, and the concrete corporeality of its organs is somewhere in space. Again therefore we come to the conclusion that space and time appertain (as Kant says) to the appearances of things. They appertain to the subject, not in itself, but to the appearance of the subject, viz., to its objectivation; accordingly they are (as opposed to what Kant says) objective, not purely subjective, and may be called subjective only in a special sense, viz., in so far as they appertain to the objectified subject, which, however, is an object like any other object in the objective world. The subject does not transfer time and space into the objective world, but anything that becomes actual thereby makes its appearance in time and space. In other words, Time, Space, and all the norms of purely formal relations, are the forms of any possible concrete existence. Whatever the metaphysical *raison d'être* of things may be, the "why there is anything," reality, when actualised, represents itself objectively as being in time and space. The thinking subject does not represent things in time and space, but in so far as it is an actual object in the objective world, it represents itself (i. e., it appears) in time and space. So do all other things: hence the concurrence of the formal notions of the objectified subject with the formal conditions of the objectified things of our surroundings. Kant says (§ 52*c*):

> "Space and time together with the appearances in them are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations but are themselves only modes of representation."[1]

He should have said (and here we use purposely Kant's own term "appearance"[2]):

> Time and space are modes of appearance, viz., of self-representation.

Being modes of appearance they are inside every subject in so far as it has made its appearance in the objective world. They are in all objects as those relational features which determine the juxtaposition of things. It is the actualised appearance that needs extension (i. e., space) for the distribution of the several organs of the thinking subject. We feel our limbs as being in different places, as moving about, as touching, as separating, etc., and these feelings are parts of our soul: they are the inside of the subject which is objectified (or comes to appearance) in our bodily existence. Our body (viz., our self as appearance) is extended, and the space needed for it is limited by the skin. The remainder of extension which accommodates the other objects of the surrounding world is designated as the outside; and if the extension within our skin is real, the outside must also be real. Both together constitute space.

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[1] It is very strange that the same Kant who says that space (viz., extension) is only a mode of representation declares (in § 2) that the sentence "bodies are extended" is analytical; accordingly he regards extension or space as the essential feature of a thing, of an object. Why then does he not recognise space as the mark of objectivism, which might have led him to concede the objective nature of the operations of the thinking subject?

[2] Appearance or phenomenon means originally the picture of objects as it appears on the retina and generally all the data of sense-perception; but the word is used in contrast to noumenon, or abstract thought, denoting the concrete object as it is given to the senses distinguished from its general abstract idea. Thus, the world of appearances means the concrete world of objects that affect our senses, though the term might be interpreted to stand for the retinal picture as a mere subjective image in contrast to the material world of objective reality. Indeed, there are authors who do use the word in the latter sense, while in the minds of most readers the two conceptions are mixed and the former is imperceptibly affected by the latter. It would not be difficult to point out what an interminable confusion the use of this word has produced in philosophy.

When Kant denies that space and time are objective, he becomes confused and self-contradictory. For he would either have to say that space and time are limited within the boundary of the body of the thinking subject, which is nonsense, or he must attribute them to the subject as a thing in itself, which contradicts his own theory according to which time and space do not refer to things in themselves, but to appearances only. Thus even from Kant's own premises and when employing his own terminology the theory becomes untenable that space and time are purely subjective attributes. Their very nature is objectivity, and if objects are appearances, time and space as the forms of all appearance must be regarded as features of existence which in their very nature are objective.

It appears that Kant was not sufficiently careful to distinguish between space-conception, which is subjective, and space itself, which, being the juxtaposition of things and their parts, is objective. Space-conception originates from within sentient organisms, viz., in the mind, by its adjustment to the surrounding world through the use of its organs. Its ultimate sources are of a physiological nature consisting in the motion of the limbs and especially the eyes. This is what Ernst Mach calls physiological space.[1] Mathematical space is a higher abstraction than physiological space. In mathematical space all incidental features, the differences of right and left, of high and low, etc., are dropped, and space is regarded as homaloidal, viz., as constituted alike throughout. The homaloidality of space is the simplest way of depriving space of all positive attributes, of rendering it the "same" throughout. At any rate it is a mental construction as much as the idea of a straight line and all geometrical figures. The construction has been made without any concrete building material, with mere mental operations, simply by proceeding on the assumption of logical consistency, where the same procedure yields the same result. That other space constructions are possible need not concern us here. At any rate, our space-conception is built up in the thinking subject by operations of which it is possessed in its capacity as an object moving about in the objective world. Our space-conception is a noumenon (a product of thought), and like all noumena, it is intended to describe features of objective reality; and these features of objective reality intended to be delineated in our space-conception is objective space—viz., the extension of the world and of its parts, the juxtaposition of bodies, and the range of directions all around every moving point.

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[1] See Ernst Mach's article "On Physiological, as Distinguished from Geometrical, Space," in *The Monist*, Vol. XI., No. 3, April, 1901.

Our space-conception is subjective, but for that reason space itself remains as objective as any object in space. Moreover, the data from which our space-conception has been constructed are as objective as are all the acts and facts of our bodily organism.

THINGS IN THEMSELVES.

Where, then, are the things in themselves, which, according to Kant, remain unintelligible?

There is a truth in the idea that our mind is so constituted as to transfer to the phenomenal world its *a priori* notions of time and space and its thought-forms. The world of our senses which appears to us as the objective world that surrounds us, is truly a construction of our organs of sense; the construction is as necessary as is for example the reflexion of a picture in a mirror; things in themselves remain outside. In this sense Kant's doctrine of idealism is undeniably true.

But Kant goes further in saying that things in themselves, meaning things viewed independently of our sense-perception, do not partake of form and are therefore unknowable. But what is knowledge if not a correct description of things? Things are mirrored in our eyes, and abstract notions are formed to represent them in mental symbols. It would be absurd to expect that things should bodily migrate into our heads.

It is the ideal of science to eliminate the subjectivity of the thinking subject and construct a world-picture in terms of formal laws, by the guidance of the several sciences of formal thought; this is the noumenal world, the world of thought; but this noumenal world is nothing but a picture (more or less accurate) of the objective world as things are independently of sense-perception. Here everything changes into motion of a definite form; the rainbow with the warm beauty of its colors becomes the reflexion of ether waves of a definite angle with definite wave-lengths. Though the noumenon is a subjective construction, it is an analogue of the objects as they are in themselves, describing their suchness. Accordingly, this would be a cognition of things in themselves, for Kant defines things in themselves as the ground which determines our sensibility to have sense-perceptions, or briefly the causes of phenomena.

Cognition is nothing more nor less than the construction of analogous symbols of things by which we can know their nature for the sake of determining their action, thus enabling us to direct the course of events by adaptation partly of ourselves to conditions, partly of our surroundings to our wants. Unless we denounce science as a vagary of the human mind, we must grant that in spite of the shortcomings of the individual scientist, the ideal of science (which consists in describing things in their objective existence) is justified, and can be more and more realised.

And what becomes of things in themselves?

If things in themselves cannot be described with the assistance of formal thoughts, they degenerate into dim chimerical and contradictory notions, such as unextended bodies, or substances without qualities, or unmaterial entities, or causes which remain outside the pale of causation.

The conception of things in themselves is a vagary of pre-Kantian metaphysics, the empty shell of which, as an irrational quantity, transcendent and unknowable, was by some mishap suffered to remain in Kant's philosophy.

If things in themselves mean objective things, viz., things as they are, independently of our sensibility, we must deny that they are unknowable. If they mean that which constitutes the essential character of the things, making them what they are, they will be seen to be determined by their suchness; they are what Plato called the eternal types of being, or ideas; and we ought to call them not "things in themselves," but "forms in themselves."

Schopenhauer interprets the Kantian conception of things in themselves as the metaphysical *raison d'être* of their existence, but he denies that its nature cannot be known and discovers its manifestation in "the Will." According to him it is the Will that makes every one what he is, and Schopenhauer's Will is not the physiological process of willing, the conscious effort of causing an idea to pass into an act, but the tendency to motion such as it inheres in all existence, in the stone as gravity, in chemicals as affinity, in sentient beings as desire. He expressly excludes that feature which distinguishes will from unconscious motions, viz., intelligence, and speaks of the blind Will. The blind Will is practically deified by him, for it is supposed to be above time and space and credited with creative omnipotence. In reality it is nothing but the widest generalisation of motion.

Clifford offers another interpretation of the term "thing in itself," viz., the sentiency of organised beings, constituting their subjectivity and corresponding to what in man is called his "soul." But, again, this subjectivity, the spiritual inside, is always the sentient accompaniment of the organisation, the bodily outside; and its nature can be determined by studying the visible exponents of its objective expression in which it is realised. Thus Clifford's things in themselves are as little unknowable as Schopenhauer's.

Agnosticism, the egg-shell of metaphysicism, prevented Kant from taking the last step suggested by his doctrine of the necessity and universality of the laws of pure form. He lost himself in contradictions and became satisfied with his statement of the antinomies of pure reason, according to which we may prove with equal plausibility that God exists or that he does not.

THE GOD-PROBLEM.

If Kant had followed the course which we here, under the guidance of the principles laid out by him, have briefly sketched out, his philosophy not only would have become less artificial and remained in close touch with the natural sciences, but it would also have helped theology to develop purer, truer, and nobler religious ideals. With the egg-shell of agnosticism on its back, Kantism was satisfied with the existing state of beliefs and things; not that Kant endorsed the various irrationalities of the Christianity of his day, the literalism of dogma, the implicit belief in the very text of the Bible, the Creation story, paternalism of the Prussian State Church, etc.; he criticised them occasionally in mild terms; but instead of going to work to purify religion (not in the narrow and prosaic spirit of his disciples, the Rationalists, but with due reverence for the poetry of dogma and legend, and at the same time with a consideration for the practical needs of the heart): he simply justified them in general terms on account of their moral usefulness in his *Critique of Practical Reason.*

As an instance, let us point out his unsatisfactory solution of the God problem.

Kant accepted in his conception of God the traditional views of the Church, and discussed it as one of the several metaphysical notions, the result being that the idea is pronounced to be transcendent, and we can with equally plausible reasons both affirm and deny his existence. It is one of Kant's four antinomies of Pure Reason. But God unknown to pure reason and not discoverable in the domain of experience and resuscitated only as a postulate of practical reason, is a poor substitute even for the mythological conception of the god of the uneducated masses. An hypothetical god cannot help; he is sicklied over with the pale cast of thought; he is not real; he is paralysed. I am far from blaming Kant, who has done so much for philosophy, for not having done more and performed a reformer's work for religion; but I would suggest that he might as well from his own principles have investigated the nature of formal laws, which in the subjective sphere of reason appear as transcendental ideas, and have come to the conclusion that a truer God-conception could be derived therefrom, which then would commend itself as the higher ideal. The popular notions of the several religions and also of a primitive theology are dim foreshadowings of a scientific God-conception, the purity of which is increasing with the progress of scientific truth.

The world-order, that purely formal law in the objective world which forms and creates, shaping the stellar universe (as Kant set forth so forcibly in his *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*), and revealing itself in the social development of man as the power that makes for righteousness, must have made its influence felt in the life of mankind at the very beginning, and would naturally, according to the practical needs of the intelligence of the successive ages, assume the shape of a conception of God, more or less crude in the beginning, and more or less philosophical in the mind of the wise. The world-order, this superpersonal spirituality that acts as the divine dispensation in the world, is hyperphysical (I purposely avoid the much-abused term "supernatural," but I might as well say supernatural). It is intrinsically necessary, it is omnipresent, it is unerring in the truth of its various applications which form as it were a grand system, comparable to the articulated differentiation of a spiritual organism,—a personality; it is as unfailingly just as the law of causation is rigid; and every God-conception is but an attempt at comprehending its moral significance.

The fetishist's notion of a power to which he must conform is not absolutely wrong. It contains a truth, but is alloyed with superstitions. The idea of thinking of God as a king of kings, as a supreme judge, is more advanced, inasmuch as God henceforth represents a moral maxim, the principle of justice in the world. The God-father idea of Christianity surpasses the theology of the prophets of the Old Testament, but it, too, falls short of the truth in all its perfection. All we have to do is to be serious in scientifically thinking the divine attributes of omnipresence, of eternality, of infinitude, of omniscience, of all-justice, of the irrefragability of law in the physical, the psychical, and the social spheres of existence, which, reflected in the instructive growth of his conscience, become to man the moral norm of life, and the ultimate authority of conduct.

Kant cited the religious notions of the theology of his age before the tribunal of pure reason and dismissed the suit as offering no issue, leaving the question in the state in which he had found it. He would have served his age better had he worked out the philosophical significance of the idea of God, on the basis of the practical significance of his Transcendentalism; he would then, instead of leaving the problem unsolved, have boldly propounded the gospel of the superpersonal God as coming, not to destroy the old theology, but to fulfil its yearnings and hopes, without in the least doing violence to the demands of criticism and scientific exactness.

EDITOR.